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Abstract
We consider environmental regulation of n risk-averse, multiple pol-
lutant ﬁrms. We develop a “yardstick competition” scheme where the
regulatory scheme depends on the diﬀerence between a ﬁrm’s “aggregate”
performance and the average “aggregate” performance of the industry.
Whether this instruments dominates Pigovian taxation depends on the
complete structure of the covariance matrix of the “common” random
terms in measured pollution. Moreover, if the number of ﬁrms is large
enough, the “yardstick scheme” is always superior to Pigovian taxation.
This analysis also provides new arguments in favor of strict liability rather
than negligence liability as regulatory tool.
Keywords: yardstick competition, multitasking, environmental reg-
ulation, asymmetric information
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11 Introduction
This paper proposes a model of “yardstick competition” for the regulation of
multi-pollutant ﬁrms.
In a system of “yardstick competition”, the transfers to an economic agent
(here: a polluting ﬁrm) do not only depend on his own performance, but also on
the performance of some reference group determined by the principal (here: the
environmental regulator). Holmstrom [7, Theorem 8] has shown how the use of
peer performance allows to “ﬁlter out” stochastic shocks that are common to
all considered agents, and thus to obtain incentive schemes that - for the same
incentive eﬀects - impose less risk on the agents than schemes that are based
on their own performance only. More speciﬁcally, Holmstrom shows that, under
some relatively mild assumptions, the optimal incentive scheme should depend
on the agent’s own performance and a weighted average of the peer group’s
performance only.
Schleifer [19] has initiated the application of this type of scheme to a regu-
latory context. However, applications of “yardstick competition” seem to focus
on the regulation of natural monopolies (see the celebrated work by Laﬀont and
Tirole [10] or, for a more recent example, Tanger˙ as [21] ), while the literature
on environmental regulation has paid relatively little attention to the potential
and drawbacks of this type of regulatory instruments.
One exception is the analysis by Govindasamy et.al. [2], who show how
rank based incentive mechanisms (or tournaments) can be used as environmental
policy tool. Tournaments were introduced by Lazear and Rosen [12] as incentive
schemes in labor contracts. In a tournament, the transfer to the regulated agent
only depends on the ranking of his performance relative to other agents, rather
then on the absolute values of these performances - tournaments are thus a very
speciﬁc type of “relative performance” incentive scheme. The main conclusion
gained by Govindasamy et.al. is that, when ﬁrms subject to environmental
regulation are risk neutral, tournaments share with emission taxes the ability
of achieving a ﬁrst-best outcome. To the best of our knowledge, the paper by
Govindasamy et.al. has not been followed by generalizations or applications.
The purpose of this paper is to apply a slightly diﬀerent incentive scheme to
a more general context.
The distinctive features of our model are the following.
First, we make use of a “relative performance” scheme of the type proposed
by Holmstrom [7], rather than of tournaments. Arguably, the most important
advantage of tournaments is indeed their reduced informational needs as com-
pared to those of other incentive mechanisms: the principal has, in fact, only
to observe “relative” performances of each agent rather than their “absolute”
performance. Hence, tournaments use ordinal rather than cardinal informa-
tion. However, if cardinal information is observable (as is the case with the
emissions of polluting ﬁrms), then tournaments will never be optimal. This has
been shown independenly by Mookherjee [14, Proposition 4] and Holmstrom [7,
Theorem 8]. Of course, as emphasized for instance by Holmstrom, these results
in themselves do not show that the particular scheme we propose corresponds
2to the global optimum. However, it is easy to verify that the “relative perfor-
mance” scheme developed in this paper dominates for instance the multi-task
tournament discussed in Franckx et.al. [5].
The second issue we focus on is related to the multi task nature of emissions
abatement performed by regulated ﬁrms. Indeed, most production activities
cause the discharge of more than one kind of pollutants in the environment.
One example could be point water pollution due to sewage treatment plants: a
properly shaped policy intervention would require the environmental regulator
in charge of water quality to account for B.O.D. (Biochemical Oxygen Demand)
emissions as well as for discharges of other toxic substances, such as mercury.
The same is true for pulp and paper industry, that in diﬀerent stages of the
production process can cause emissions of BOD, SO2 and toxic chemicals, such
as dioxins. A ﬁnal example can be nitrogen and phosphorus emissions from the
use of fertilizers in agriculture.
Govindasamy et.al. [2] underline the multidimensional nature of pollution
reducing eﬀort levels, but they do not address the related modeling problems,
simply suggesting the use of an aggregate index as a measure of polluting ﬁrms’
eﬀort. 1
Our approach here has thus been inspired by the multi task principal/agent
analysis performed by Holmstrom and Milgrom [8]: Holmstrom and Milgrom ex-
tend the standard principal/agent model to allow for multidimensional tasks to
be performed by workers, and, inter alia, provide an explanation for real-world
phenomena such as missing incentive clauses in contracts and “low-powered”
incentives in ﬁrms.
The third issue of our analysis is the introduction of risk aversion. Risk and
uncertainty can indeed be crucial in environmental policy design, as the perfor-
mance of diﬀerent pollution control instruments might be severely aﬀected by
diﬃculties related to emissions measurement or stochastic impacts on ambient
pollution. In the case of small, owner-operated business, the assumption of risk
aversion is certainly not far-fetched. As Holmstrom and Milgrom underline, in-
centive mechanisms “...serve the dual function of allocating risk and rewarding
productive work” [8, p. 25]. However in Govindasamy et.al. [2], regulated ﬁrms
are risk neutral, so that no conﬂict among eﬃciency and risk “insurance” arises
(which explains why they obtain ﬁrst best results).
A fourth innovation is that we consider more general production and abate-
ment technologies: contrary to Govindasamy et.al., we do not assume that pro-
duction and abatement decisions are separable, or that there is a single input
in abatement.
Finally, Govindasamy et.al. impose a very speciﬁc form of budget balancing
where expected gross social beneﬁts from pollution abatement are re-distributed
to regulated ﬁrms via the regulatory scheme. We think it is more realistic to
assume that the incentive schemes are paid out of (or contribute to) the general
1Note that this multi task nature of regulation is not limited to environmental regulation.
For instance, in their celebrated work on regulation, Laﬀont and Tirole point out that “concern
has been expressed about the eﬀects of yardstick competition on cost. It is feared that ﬁrms
would concentrate their eﬀorts on reducing cost and would sacriﬁce quality.” [10, p. 212].
3budget of the government, which is ﬁnanced out of distortionary taxation.
Starting from these arguments, we model a situation where risk averse
ﬁrms subject to environmental policy emit several pollutants. We assume that
emissions are subject to stochastic inﬂuences (or measurement errors). These
stochastic inﬂuences can be split in terms that are ﬁrm-speciﬁc (or idiosyncratic)
and terms that are identical across ﬁrms (from now, we shall call these “com-
mon” terms). Thus, contrary to what is usually investigated in the literature on
“yardstick competition”, we consider a problem of moral hazard (hidden action)
and not adverse selection (hidden information).
We then develop a multi-task “yardstick” instrument rewarding the ﬁrm
according to the diﬀerence between their “aggregate” performance and the av-
erage “aggregate” performance of all the regulated ﬁrms. In this scheme, the
environmental regulator chooses the weights assigned to each pollutant in de-
termining aggregate performance of each ﬁrm. We show that, with risk averse
ﬁrms, optimal emission levels depend on the number of ﬁrms, on the technical
relationship between output and emissions, and on the covariance matrix of the
common error terms.
We show subsequently that the “yardstick competition” scheme dominates
Pigovian taxes if (1) the variance of at least one common random term is high
enough or (2) if the covariance between diﬀerent common error terms is high
enough. While the ﬁrst point is a generalization of a point that is well known
in a one-dimensional setting, the second point is a new contribution. Moreover,
we show that if the number of ﬁrms is high enough, “yardstick competition”
always dominates Pigovian taxation.
Our work also provides insights in the debate concerning the choice of “en-
vironmental” liability rules, as an alternative to direct pollution regulation.
Speciﬁcally, we provide an argument in favor of strict liability when pollution
control involves performing multiple tasks, some of which cannot be contracted
upon.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3,
we derive the main features of a relative performance incentive scheme. Section
4 analyzes the properties of emission taxes. In Section 5, we compare the relative
welfare properties of the two proposed environmental policy tools. In Section 6,
we show that the insights from the analysis of yardstick competition in a multi-
dimensional setting help to understand some fundamental problems related to
negligence liability. Finally, Section 7 concludes and suggests directions for
future research.
2 The Model
We model a regulatory context where an environmental protection agency is in
charge of environmental quality in a certain region.
There are n ﬁrms i = 1,...,n. 2 These ﬁrms produce a homogenous output
2With a given number of ﬁrms, there are no entry/exit issues but we do have to consider
participation constraints.
4qi. qi is sold at a market price p. In order to remain consistent with the
assumption that ﬁrms are risk averse, we suppose they are “small” and thus
price-takers.
The ﬁrms also generate a veriﬁable vector of emissions ei ≡ (ei1 ...eij ...eiJ).
Total emissions for pollutant j are ej =
Pn
i=1 eij and the vector of total emis-
sions is e ≡
Pn
i=1 ei.
Observed emissions are eij = sij+ηe
j +e
ij, where sij, expected emissions, are
a choice variable for the ﬁrms. The ηe
j and e
ij are stochastic terms, which can
be interpreted both as genuine random inﬂuences and as measurement errors.
The ηe
j are common across ﬁrms while the e
ij are ﬁrm-speciﬁc.
ηe
j follows a normal law with zero mean and covariance matrix Ση. The e
ij
follow a normal law with zero mean and covariance matrix Σ. The common
shocks and the idiosyncratic shocks are independently distributed. Therefore,
the covariance matrix of the sum of the two stochastic terms is simply the sum
of the individual covariance matrices Σ = Σ + Ση.
Let si ≡ (si1 ...sij ...siJ).
The cost function associated with an output qi and an expected emission
vector si will be denoted C (qi,si) - we assume thus that ﬁrms are identical
and that their cost function is common knowledge. Of course, we assume that
∂C(.)
∂sij < 0.
As there is no stochasticity in production, unregulated proﬁts are:
Πi (.) ≡ pqi − C (qi,si). (1)
The regulator requires the ﬁrms to engage in pollution abatement activ-
ity. We deﬁne “abatement” in a broad sense, including actions such as output
reduction, scrubbers installation and so on.
We shall make no assumption with respect to the veriﬁability of the inputs
used in production and abatement. We shall just assume that, for some reason,
the regulator is constrained not to base its regulatory scheme on inputs or
outputs.3
We assume that each ﬁrm i’s has constant absolute risk aversion, measured
by a parameter ρ, and has mean-variance preferences. If wi is a payment whose
precise value depends on the chosen pollution control instrument4, then the
ﬁrm’s expected utility function is:




3Actually, it can be shown that, in general, it is optimal to combine emission based mecha-
nisms with input based mechanisms if ﬁrms are risk averse. However, with multiple pollutants,
the results become quickly intractable - full details of this argument can be obtained from the
authors on request.
4In general, under uncertainty the ﬁrms’ preferences are expected to depend also on mo-
ments of the error terms’ distributions diﬀerent from the mean and the variance. As a con-
sequence the mean-variance functional form we propose in the text is intended to be an
approximation. See Hirshleifer and Riley [6] for a discussion, and Laﬀont and Tirole [9] for
an application in a regulatory context.
5Finally, expected social costs from pollution are given by: E (D(e)). Note
that this formulation takes into account that there might be externalities be-
tween the diﬀerent pollutants.
3 Linear yardstick competition
We model, in this section, a n-player yardstick competition scheme.
Before the “game” takes place, the regulator commits to the weights given
to each outcome in determining the “overall performance” of each player; call
this weight γj for net emissions eij.
“Overall observed performance” for player i will, therefore, be (where γ =
(γ1 ...γj ...γJ) and · is the inner product of two vectors):
γ · ei (3)
Player k receives (or pays) the following compensation scheme:










Our aim is to determine the optimal ﬁxed wage w0 and a set of “performance
weights” γj. To do this, we ﬁrst derive abatement strategies by the ﬁrms, given
an arbitrary value for w0 and an arbitrary level for the γjs.
Thus, let us ﬁrst turn to the ﬁrms’ problem.

























We can therefore conclude that yardstick competition is indeed capable of
sorting out common error terms.
Hence, ﬁrm k’s expected regulatory transfer is:














Therefore, the certainty equivalence of ﬁrm k’s expected utility is:



















If all emission levels induced by the incentive scheme are strictly positive,







If the ﬁrms are identical, then the FOC for the other players will be sym-
metric.
We limit our attention to symmetric Nash equilibria.








. The FOC with respect
to the emissions can then be expressed as follows (where from now on we leave






Let us now turn to the regulator’s problem.















This shows that the total transfer is a constant. Hence, the principal does
not gain from ﬁling false reports on observed performance, which is an important
drawback of the credibility of incentive schemes based on individual performance
(see for instance Malcomson [13]).
We assume that these regulatory transfers are ﬁnanced out of distortionary
taxation.
If the ﬁrms are price takers, then we can ignore consumer surplus. Moreover,
for reasons of political feasibility, we assume that the regulator does not want
any ﬁrms to be driven out of business following the introduction of the scheme.
For a utilitarian regulator, the objective function is therefore the sum of ﬁrms’
expected utility, minus environmental damages, minus transfers to the ﬁrms
(evaluated at the social price of public funds, 1 + λ):
n








− E (D(e)) − n(1 + λ)w0, (11)
subject to the ﬁrms’ participation and incentive compatibility constraints.
We see immediately that we can use w0 to satisfy the participation con-
straint, and thus that social welfare can be rewritten as:
7n(1 + λ)








− E (D(e)) (12)



















Let [Π00] be the Hessian of the proﬁt function, let Πqq =
∂
2Π(.)









and let Πss be the Hessian of the proﬁt function with respect
to the emission vector.
[A] is the J × (J + 1) matrix formed by the juxtaposition of a ﬁrst colum
Π−1
qq ΠT
qs and the J × J diagonal matrix with diagonal element −1.
This leads us to the ﬁrst important result with yardstick competition:
Proposition 1 Suppose that all the standard second order conditions are satis-
ﬁed. The optimal output and emission levels in a yardstick competition scheme






= E0. The optimal incentive
scheme is given by Π0
s = n−1
n γ.
Proof. The Lagrangian is:
n(1 + λ)





















where µq is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (8) and µ ≡ (µ1 ...µJ)
is the vector of Lagrange multipliers associated with the incentive compatibility
constraints (10).
The FOC with respect to γT is:
−(1 + λ)nρ ΣγT − µT = 0. (13)
Thus, for ρ > 0, at least one of the ﬁrms’ IC constraints must be binding.





sΣ = µ. (14)
The FOC with respect to the output and the emission vector is:
(n(1 + λ)Π0 − E0)
T + [Π00](µq µ)
T = 0. (15)
8As the FOC for the ﬁrm implies
∂Π(.)
∂q = 0, we immediately obtain that the
ﬁrst line of (15) reduces to:
Πqqµq + ΠqsµT = 0 (16)
Substitute (14) in (16):















This condition determines the optimal output and emission levels.
Comments
1. If the cost function is separable in output and emissions, then Πqs is the
null vector. It is then easy to verify that the optimal emission levels are
given by
E0

















and Ij is the J × J unit matrix.
Thus, in this particular case, the determination of optimal emissions does
not depend on the output decision.
2. Suppose (see Holmstrom and Milgrom [8, p. 32]) that the error terms
are stochastically independent and that the emissions are technologically
independent as well (thus, that
∂
2Π(.)
∂sj∂sk = 0 if j 6= k). In that case, the
conditions with respect to the emission levels in (18) reduce to:
∂E (D(e))(.)
∂sj
















j is the variance of j.
Thus, in this case, the problem reduces to j independent one-task prob-
lems. However, in general, it is not optimal to ignore the stochastic and
technological dependencies between the diﬀerent types of emissions in de-
signing the yardstick incentive scheme. Or, to put it diﬀerently: it is not
indicated that diﬀerent types of pollutants are regulated independently by
specialized bureaus.
93. As noted before, the yardstick incentive scheme is completely independent
of the common error term, even if this common error term becomes ex-
tremely “diﬀuse”. If there are no idiosyncratic measurement errors, we
see that E0 = n(1 + λ)Π0 satisﬁes (18) and thus that yardstick incentive
schemes allow to obtain the ﬁrst best solution however large the variance
of the common error - this is a generalization of a result that is well known
in one-dimensional context (see for instance Laﬀont and Tirole [10, p. 85]).
4. If agents are risk-neutral, then E0 = n(1 + λ)Π0 satisﬁes (18). Thus,
yardstick incentive schemes allow to obtain the ﬁrst-best solution when
agents are risk neutral. On the other hand, with risk-averse agents, there is
a distortion in the relative weights γ compared to the principal’s marginal
beneﬁts.
4 Pollution Taxes
The analysis of optimal regulation under pollution taxes is a natural extension of
the existing literature. We write it down explicitly for the sake of completeness.
Suppose thus that the regulator imposes a vector of taxes (which is assumed
to be uniform across ﬁrms): t = (t1 ...tj ...tJ), where tj is the tax on ej. A
ﬁxed tax (or subsidy) w0 is used to satisfy the participation constraint.
Again, let us ﬁrst turn to the ﬁrms’ problem.
Firm 1’s expected payment is t · si.
Therefore, ﬁrm’s 1’s expected utility is:




where tΣtT is the variance of each agent’s tax payments.




and (assuming an interior solution for all emission levels)
Π0
s = t. (21)
Let us now turn to the regulator’s problem. As with yardstick competition, it
can easily be veriﬁed that the participation constraint bites. After substitution
of these constraints, the Lagrangian is (where µq is the Lagrange multiplier













s − t)µT. (22)
10The FOC with respect to t is then:
−n(1 + λ)ρΣtT − µT = 0. (23)
Of course, if ρ = 0, this is satisﬁed for µk = 0 for all k.
Substitution of (21) in (23):
−n(1 + λ)ρΠ0
sΣ = µ. (24)




T = 0. (25)
As the FOC for the ﬁrm implies
∂Π(.)
∂q = 0, we immediately obtain:
Πqqµq + ΠqsµT = 0 (26)
Substitution of (24) in (26) yields:
µq = Π−1
qq n(1 + λ)ρΠ0
sΣΠT
qs (27)
Combination of (24), (25) and (27) yields the following characterization of
the optimal output and emission vector (notice the analogy with (18)):5
n(1 + λ)(Π0 + ρΠ0
sΣ[A][Π00]) = E0. (28)
This is compatible with the usual Holmstrom and Milgrom conditions for
piece rates [8].
Note that with risk neutral ﬁrms and λ = 0, we would obtain the conven-
tional result that marginal beneﬁts should equal marginal external damages.
5 Comparisons
Let us now compare the ”welfare” properties of unit emission taxes with the
yardstick scheme.
Under yardstick competition, social welfare is (substitute the results of Propo-













− E (D(e)) (29)
Similarly, under environmental taxation, it is:
























As this inequality is also valid for the output and emission vector that cor-
respond to the optimal yardstick scheme, we obtain immediately:
Proposition 2 Suppose there is no common shock. There always exists a set
of unit emission taxes that is Pareto-superior to the optimal yardstick scheme.
Proof. If there is no common shock, then Σ = Σ. The proof is then
completed by noting that n
n−1 > 1.
This result is a generalization of a result that is well known in a one-
dimensional setting (see Holmstrom [7, Theorem 7]).
We also obtain:
Proposition 3 There exists a yardstick scheme that dominates unit emission
taxes if:
• at least one common error term has a ”suﬃciently high” variance
• and/or if at least two common error terms show a positive and ”suﬃciently
strong” covariance.
• if the number of ﬁrms is suﬃciently large, where the critical number of










This argument is independent of the agents’ degree of risk aversion.














ber that the unregulated proﬁt function is increasing in emission levels, so that
∂Π(.)
∂sk > 0 for all k. The proof is completed by observing that (30) is also valid
for the output and emission vector that correspond to the optimal unit emission
taxes.
Results summed up in Proposition 3 are a consequence of the main theoret-
ical advantage of yardstick schemes, namely their ability to “sort out” of the
payment determination common random terms.
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 3 extends to a multi task setting a result ob-
tained in tournament theory by Green and Stokey [3].
12On the other hand, the second part of Proposition 3 is a new result, and leads
to the conclusion that a positive correlation among common random terms can
cause yardstick schemes to be Pareto superior with respect to pollution taxes
even if the variance of common measurement errors is low.
Indeed, measurement diﬃculties aﬀecting all regulated ﬁrms in the same way
can play a relevant role in determining the performance of environmental policy
instruments. Consider, for example, a laboratory working for the environmental
regulator, whose main duty is the measurement of the amount of water pollu-
tion generated by n regulated ﬁrms; the resulting tax payment by ﬁrms is then
determined by the environmental regulator on the basis of such assessment. In
this case, both ﬁrms’ performance concerning each pollutant is likely to be mon-
itored using the same device (and the same people). In the presence of a high
variance in the resulting “common” measurement errors, Proposition 3 suggests
that yardstick schemes might be a “socially desirable” environmental policy in-
strument, as they would “cancel out” the related risk from the payment deter-
mination. On the other hand, even if water pollution could be measured inside
the laboratory using relatively precise monitoring and/or estimation method-
ologies, it could be the case that the same device or measurement technique is
used to measure the amount of diﬀerent pollutants; this could, in turn, generate
a strong positive covariance among common measurement errors. In this case
as well, Proposition 3 suggests the use of relative compensation mechanisms.
A possible alternative interpretation of the error terms is that they represent
“true random variations”. For example, weather conditions can aﬀect the way
diﬀerent chemicals discharged by regulated ﬁrms “translate” into polluted water
(or air). If the n regulated ﬁrms are subject to the same weather conditions,
Proposition 3 suggests that yardstick schemes are likely to dominate taxes. This
point remains valid if the ﬁrms have multiple plants, as long as they both emit
the same type of pollutants at each plant (for instance, because the production
process at each plant depends on the proximity of raw materials).
Finally, the impact of the number of ﬁrms is new as well. This result can be
understood as follows. The advantage of yardstick regulation is that the common
error terms disappear, which reduces the variance of the compensation scheme
compared to Pigovian taxation. However, the ﬁrm’s payoﬀs now depend on the
(stochastic) average performance of the other ﬁrms, which is a new element of
risk. Hence, for a small number of ﬁrms, it is possible that this second eﬀect
dominates. However, when the number of ﬁrms increases, these idiosyncratic
terms will cancel out on average due to the law of large numbers, and, in the
limit, the additional risk imposed by the industry’s performance reduces to zero.
6 Liability Rules and Environmental Damages:
some considerations
Liability rules for environmental accidents have been proposed as an instrument
to control pollution that is alternative to regulation, especially in cases when
13toxic or particularly hazardous substances are involved. Siebert [20] refers to
strict liability, implying that who causes an environmental accident has to pay
for the damages irrespective of negligence, and to negligence rules, requiring a
prescribed level of “due care”, so that who causes environmental harm is held
liable if the prescribed standard of care has not been applied.
The link between negligence rules and our multitask yardstick schemes is
easy to see. Indeed, precautions to avoid accidents often have multi-dimensional
features. Furthermore, standards in negligence liability are often based on a rel-
ative basis: this is indeed the case when law enforces “...the best practices in
industry ” [1, p. 315, emphasis added]. In such a way, courts eliminate com-
mon shocks (such as industry speciﬁc risks) in the determination of negligence
standards. Another example of “relative” negligence rules can be found in the
so-called “state-of-the-art defense”, as it “...creates a relative test of liability...”
that “relies almost exclusively on a comparison between the characteristics of
the defendants’ production process and the characteristics of its competitors’
process.” [4, p. 7]6. However, in reality, there are cases when neither negligence
rules nor yardstick schemes can take all dimensions into account in determining
the required standard of care.
Holmstrom and Milgrom [8] have dedicated Section 3 of their analysis to
situations where some dimensions of the agent’s performance cannot be con-
tracted upon. They have used this framework to explain real-world phenomena
such as missing incentive clauses in contracts and “low-powered” incentives in
ﬁrms. It is straightforward (detailed arguments are available from the authors
on request) to verify that the analysis of Holmstrom and Milgrom generalizes
completely to yardstick schemes. Therefore, yardstick schemes cannot be used
to attenuate this type of problems, and neither do negligence rules, sharing the
same underlying logic.
These insights explain a possible reason why the “inability to determine
optimal activity levels except in simple cases is potentially a serious shortcoming
of a negligence system” [16, p. 193].
Of course, other relevant issues have to be taken into account when dealing
with the choice among strict and negligence liability7, but the failure of (yard-
stick schemes and) negligence rules as a way out from situations where some
dimensions of performance cannot be contracted upon is an argument in favor
of strict environmental liability and, thus, in favor of transferring all risk to
the regulated agent. Indeed, under strict liability, the polluter gets the correct
incentives concerning activity levels aﬀecting the probability of environmental
accidents.
6For example, under state of the art defense, ﬁrms can avoid liability if the production
process safety at time of production compared favorably to the customary practices in the
industry.
7See, for example, [15] for a discussion.
147 Conclusion
We have considered environmental regulation of n risk-averse ﬁrms, and com-
pared a set of unit emission taxes with a multi-task “yardstick competition”
scheme.
Our ﬁrst conclusion has been that the higher the variance of “common” ran-
dom terms, the more “socially desirable” will be the “yardstick competition”
mechanism we propose. Furthermore, we have shown that, in the presence of
a suﬃciently strong positive correlation among diﬀerent common errors, “yard-
stick competition” Pareto dominates unit emission taxes. Also, if the number
of ﬁrms grows to inﬁnity, the yardstick system always dominates unit emission
taxes. We have also provided insights on “environmental” liability rules, as an
alternative to direct pollution regulation, and presented arguments in favor of
strict liability.
Of course, this paper could be extended in many ways. For instance, the
bulk of the literature of yardstick regulation treats problems of adverse selection
rather than moral hazard (see Tanger˙ as [21] for a recent example). Hence,
further insights could be gained from relaxing the assumption of identical and
known abatement cost functions for the regulated ﬁrms.
Also, it is possible that, in practice, global ambient pollution levels can
be measured with a substantially smaller variance (or at a substantially lower
cost) than individual pollution levels. In that case, the problems turns into a
nonpoint source problem and collective penalty schemes, such as ﬁrst proposed
by Segerson [18], could be optimal. However, a comparison between the schemes
proposed here and the Segerson-type mechanism requires a detailed modeling
of how individual emissions translate in ambient levels - it is left as area for
further research.8
Finally, with yardstick competition, there is a risk for collusive behavior. The
development of collusion-proof schemes is also the subject of further research
by the authors.
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